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Draft Recommendation
on the Euclid programme and cooperation between
European defence electronics industries
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the new political and military realities facing its member countries oblige them to
undertake a thorough restructuring of their armed forces, which implies a considerable reduction in their
strength;
(ii) Noting that this situation requires the rapid development of increasingly sophisticated arms systems
for armies that are constantly becoming smaller;
(iii) Noting that the result is a preponderance of quality over quantity, which implies above all else the
enhancement of new technologies;
(iv) Considering that such enhancement requires a greater effort to be made in cooperation ventures and
in research and developmentl
(t') Noting that the main area of application of the new technologies is that of defence electronics;
(vi) Considering that its member countries must make the best possible use of their resources and capa-
bilities through cooperation and unreserved support, whether in the public or private sector, for research
and development activities:
(vii) Taking into account also the fact that the defence industries of the European countries generally
depend on their respective governments as regards both purchases and rules on exports;
(r'lli) Noting in addition that the domestic markets open to those industries are small and that public fun-
ding for research is inadequate, while the situation prevailing in the United States defence industry is quite
the reverse:
(ix) Giving due consideration to the existence of the Euclid programme, the only European military
cooperation programme in the field of research and development;
(x) Recalling that the objectives of Euclid are to optimise the use of European resources allocated to
research and development and facilitate cooperation on equipment procurement programmes;
(xi) Welcoming the creation of the Euclid Research Cell whose objective is to improve the programme's
output, in particular by promoting the activities of the CEPA Steering Committees, speeding up the pro-
cess for the approval of contracts and setting up a centralised legal service for the award of such contracts;
(xii) Deeming therefore that the Euclid programme and Research Cell constitute an appropriate frame-
work for activities but that it is clearly necessary to exploit to the full the possibilities they offer and
resolve the problems besetting them;
(xiii) Aware that in order to achieve that objective, the member states will above all else have to demons-
trate unfaltering political resolve:
(xit') Anticipating a reply from the Council to Recommendation 584, with particular reference to Panel II
and in general with regard to the Euclid programme,
REcorruguos rHAT trrp Couxclr-
l. Apply to the Euclid programme an overall strategy for the medium and long term that is based on
technological forecasts while taking account of military operational requirements and those new techno-
logies that are most promising from the commercial viewpoint;
2. Request the governments to draw up budget forecasts for the Euclid programme in multi-annual
slices and, in any event, at least one year in advance;
3. Ensure that the governments increase their financial contributions to the Euclid programme both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of their participation compared with that of industry;
4. Endeavour to reactivate the RTPs that are at present dormant;
DOCUMENT 1524
5. Study ways of introducing a measure of flexibility in the rules on industrial property rights so as to
relax the requirements imposed on firms taking part in the programme;
6. Set up a register of European industrial establishments working in the defence sector which, by pro-
viding an inventory of technologies, products and systems, would lead to the creation of efficient consor-
tia;
7. Seek ways of associating civil and military research projects with common technological objec-
tives;
8. Take the steps necessary to ensure that the Euclid programme pays more attention to information
systems for commanding and using information technologies;




(submitted by Mr lipez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. In order to meet today's new political and
military challenges in what is an unstable econo-
mic situation, armies in western Europe are enga-
ged in the task of restructuring and reducing their
military forces. The restructuring process also
affects armaments systems, particularly in the light
of the lessons learnt during the Gulf war. These
changes are occurring in parallel with reductions
in defence budgets. which are very extensive in
some cases and even draconian in others.
2. A whole series of factors is therefore invol-
ved, many of which are interconnected with some
even stemming from others. They include d6tente,
disarmament, defence budget reductions, etc. and
the overall impact on the defence industry is a
very serrous one.
3. All these factors have led to the develop-
ment of increasingly sophisticated arms systems
given that the armies using them are constantly
shrinking in size. In fact, quantity is being repla-
ced by quality or. in other words, the objective
being sought is mainly that of enhancing new
technologies, which presupposes more work at
the research and development stage.
4. All the experts agree that in view of the les-
sons learnt during the Gulf war, as mentioned
above, the fields of application of such technolo-
gies should mainly be limited to antimissile
defence. space-based surveillance. high-precision
guided weapons, the identification of mobile tar-
gets and the command systems for the conduct of
campaigns and intelligence operations in real
time't all these technologies are the preserve of
the defence electronics industry.
5. Therefore, at a time when the defence
industries in general are going through a difficult
period. there is a glimpse of a promising future for
defence electronics, particularly in western Euro-
pean countries, provided they can make the proper
use of the resources and capacities available,
mainly through cooperation and by providing
strong and determined support for research and
development in both the public and private sectors.
6. In addition, your Rapporteur wishes to
point out that the report by Mrs Guirado and Lord
1. General Sdnchez-Mendez: operational and technical pro-
blems raised by new threats. Defence electronics at the dawn
ofthe 21st century. Published by the Fundaci6n Universrdad-
Empresa. Mrlitary electronics forum Madnd 1995.
Dundee on " WEAG: the course to be followed "
(Document 1483), adopted by the Technological
and Aerospace Committee on 6 November 1995,
has already made a detailed study of WEAG
Panel II and the Euclid programme and of the pro-
blems and characteristics of the defence industry
in Europe. Among other things, it discussed
various aspects of European armaments coopera-
tion. For that reason, the present report will
endeavour not to discuss these issues further. in so
far as that is possible, and in any event will refer
those readers wishing to have an overall view of
the question to the aforementioned document.
II. The Eucli.d programme
7. WEAG (Western European Armaments
Group) Panel II has as its main objective to
strengthen Europe's position in the field of
defence research and technology. One of the
panel's activities is management of the Euclid
programme (European cooperation for the long
term in defence).
8. The Euclid programme was launched in
1990 (the memorandum of understanding was
signed on 16 November 1990) and is Europe's
sole military cooperation programme in research
and technology.
9. Euclid aims both to optimise the resources
Europe devotes to research and technology stu-
dies and facilitate cooperation in equipment pro-
curement programmes. It is intended to strengthen
European industrial, technological and scientific
cooperation in the defence field. To this end. the
programme identifies a range of CEPAs (Com-
mon European Priority Areas) and within them
organises RTPs (Research and Technology Pro-
jects), based on future equipment needs. Although
Euclid's results can be described as promising,
they still leave much to be desired.
10. According to Assembly Document 1483(" WEAG: the course to be followed " submitted
by Mrs Guirado and Lord Dundee) there are at
present thirteen CEPAs in which action is being
taken, 49 approved RTPs and 29 signed contracts,
worth 210 million ecus'in total. In 1990, defence
2. According to the EDIG document " Summary report on
the debnefing meeting held with Panel II in Brussels on
13 February 1996 ", the number of RTPs has gone up to 57
but the average value of an RTP has fallen from 5 to 4 million
ecus. See Appendix I.
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ministers fixed an annual programme target of
120 million ecus but stagnancy has set in at a
figure of half that amount. In November 1994 it
was decided to create a Euclid Research Cell
within WEAG. The Cell liaises at operational
level with Panel II and the RTMC (Research and
Technology Management Committee), imple-
ments measures adopted by both, gives adminis-
trative support to the CEPA Steering Committees
and to RTP management groups, in addition to
providing assistance to other programmes and
iubgroups and maintaining working relations
with the WEAG Armaments Secretariat and
through it with Panel III 3.
11. The objectives of the Euclid Research Cell
are to:
- 
improve the effectiveness of the Euclid
programme;
- 
coordinate and promote CEPA Steering
Committee activities;
-speed up the process for awarding
contracts;
- 
provide a centralised legal service for the
award of contracts (planned for the
second phase due to begin in 1996).
12. Further measures, proposed by Panel II, are
also planned to solve the problems Euclid has
encountered. According to Victor Margais', such
measures include:
- 
" the decision in principle to give the
Research Cell greater autonomy, after a
probationary period, by granting it the
status of subsidiary organ of WEU plan-
ned for the European Armaments Agency
and making it responsible for placing
Euclid contracts and following them up;
- 
the recommendation to take account, in
the Euclid research programme, of topics
developed in other cooperation frame-
works that exist between WEAG coun-
tries;
- 
the approval of the EUROFINDER pro-
cedure allowing unsolicited proposals to
be taken into account in the programme,
emanating from industrial consortia sub-
mitting technological cooperation bids;
also, the decision to hold a first EURO-
FINDER seminar as from SePtember
1995 ".
13. In fact, throughout the Euclid programme
and as its shortcomings have come to light, there
have been constant efforts to improve its working.
3. Panel III's remit covers general joint policy guidelines in
defence economlcs and armaments cooperation procedures'
4. Article in the periodic newsletter issued by the National
Euclid coordinator, No. 6, DGA, 6 March 1995.
14. For instance, at the October 1993 meeting
of National Armaments Directors. the Chairman
of Panel II gave a detailed report on the Euclid pro-
gramme and described a series of measures desi-
gned to make it more effective. The conclusions of
the meeting can be summarised as follows:
- 
measures were proposed to reduce the
length of time between a project's appro-
val and signature of the relevant contract,
- 
participants stressed their concern about
the fact that the Euclid programme was not
progressing despite the National Arma-
ments Directors' proposal in 1992 to
increase the number of RTPs. In fact, out of
the 38 RTPs approved by Panel II in Octo-
ber 1993, 37 of them had already been
approved a year earlier in October 1992;
- 
at the time, the annual cost of the appro-
ved projects came to half (60 million
ecus) the amount set aside by defence
ministers for the programme's initial
phase (120 million ecus);
- 
in order to give the Euclid programme
new impetus, it was proposed to hold a
colloquy in the second half of 1994.
during which the programme's first
results would be presented.
15. The National Armaments Directors decided
to support the arrangements designed to reduce the
period between a project's approval and signature
of the contract for it to a maximum of one year.
Under one of the arrangements, each ministry is to
smooth the procedures leading to the signature of
contracts, and holds special funds for the Euclid
programme. Furthermore, the NADs stressed that
the chairmen and members of the CEPAs should
draw up proposals for new projects.
16. " The future of the defence-related indus-
tries " 5 sets out criteria and conclusions similar to
those described above. It considers that the pro-
gramme started up more slowly than had been
planned, mainly because of the time it took some
countries to draw the consequences of the frame-
work agreement signed in 1990 and because of
the lack of joint permanent structures that could
have been used for the programme's management
and logistics requirements. According to the
study, those structures could take the form of the
European Armaments Agency for which provi-
sion is made in the Declaration by the WEU mem-
ber countries. annexed to the Treaty on European
Union. To begin with, the Agency could concen-
trate on " reducing the time required for the noti-
fication of Euclid contracts " and " improving the
procedure for identifying new themes for Euclid
5. Commissarrat Gdn6ral
gaise, Paris 1995.
du Plan, La Documentatton fran-
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cooperation ". The same study suggests that at a
later stage the Agency could take on the task of
" giving thought to a rapprochement between
various national defence research programmes
and drawing up a draft for a joint technology pro-
gramme ".
17. As regards the armaments industries, which
were associated with the Euclid programme from
the outset, the report referred to earlier stresses
that they should play a part in the programme's
development, that their suggestions should be
taken into account. and above all that the number
of participants in a given venture should be limi-
ted (bi- or trilateral cooperation projects are
considered more effective), that it should be borne
in mind that defence firms do not have sufficient
resources to fund a substantial part of their
research activities on their own, and that progress
in European defence cooperation will to a large
extent depend on relations developed between
firms.
III. The European defence industries' views on
the Euclid programme
18. Over the last few years (1993, 1994 and
1995). EDIG (the European Defence Industries
Group) has submitted a series of recommenda-
tions with a view to improving the Euclid pro-
gramme. In its latest proposal. dated July 1995,
EDIG considered that the creation of the Research
Cell would have a positive impact on the Euclid
programme, the first sign being an increased out-
put which would make it more attractive to the
industry from the technical viewpoint. But EDIG
believes that certain obstacles to participation by
the industry cannot be surmounted until the
second phase. mainly by reducing the time it takes
to place contracts, thus enabling firms to reduce
the cost of their proposals.
19. EDIG takes the view that the Euclid pro-
gramme poses a number of problems for firms
that hamper their involvement. The main problem
areas are the delays involved, the lack of a global
strategy, the rules on industrial property laid down
in the memorandum of understanding. and the
industry's financial participation.
20. It usually takes about 14 months to complete
the procedure that starts with the first examination
by a CEPA Steering Committee of a subject that
might result in an RTP, continues with the signature
of the implementing arrangement (IA) and ends
with the signature of the contract 6. According to
EDIG, this period is too long as firms lose interest
6. On the working of the Euclid programme, see Assembly
Document 1483: " WEAG: the course to be followed " sub-
mltted bv Mrs Gurrado and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs.
because of doubts about the merits of such an
investment for a project that gradually loses its
topicality.
21. In some cases, a country participating in an
RTP drops out once the procedure is under way,
causing additional delays for the other countries.
Sometimes, such a decision to drop out even
causes the RTP to be abandoned. The EDIG study
considers that in many cases the problem is not
due to the number of new RTPs, since many of
them are on the shelf owing to a lack of funding,
but rather to " the lack of preparation by the
govemments of the decisions to allocate funding
to RTPs in which they are interested. Decisions
are taken RTP by RTP, without any appearance of
a global policy ".
22. This absence of a global policy is precisely
one of the weaknesses of the Euclid programme.
Not only are the budget resources allocated by
governments to the programme insufficient, but
worse still governments do not adopt funding pro-
grammes that cover a number of years as they do
in the case of national programmes. Thus, the
industry tends to regard Euclid as a programme
for activities that are limited and that are separate
from each other instead of forming part of a gene-
ral strategy " deduced from a long-term technico-
operational approach ". The lack of a real finan-
cial commitment on the part of governments
prompts the industry to have reservations about
entering into commitments itself.
23. Another problem brought to light by EDIG
concerns the rules on industrial property rights
laid down in the memorandum of understanding.
The excessive demands made on participant firms
can lead to information they are required to pro-
duce being used against their interests even to the
point of disrupting competition.
24. The industry's financial participation is
close to 50Vo. According to EDIG, governmentsjustify such a high contribution rate by the fact
that this is the level applied in the Community's
research programmes and the Eureka programme.
This argument does not convince European
defence firms, whose logical and justified res-
ponse to government is that " they simply forget
that this industry is concerned with a commercial
activity which can later provide a financial return
on its investment in research. The European
defence industry is dependent on governments for
its activity and cannot expect any return without
long-term programmes. Moreover, the European
industry's major competitor, the American indus-
try, is fully subsidised by government for research
and development activities ".
25. EDIG has put forward a series of recom-
mendations which it says will improve the Euclid
programme and make it more attractive to the
industry.
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26. In the first place, all governments need to
increase their financial involvement substantially.
In actual fact, government funding accounts for
less than half of the budget planned at the start of
the programme and this amount represents 2lVo of
the entire research and development budget for
European defence (60 million ecus out of a total
of 2 200 million ecus in 1994). These figures
alone suffice to cast doubt on the resolve of
WEAG member governments to maintain a Euro-
pean defence industrial base through the Euclid
programme.
27. Secondly, EDIG recommends that govern-
ments should plan funding for the Euclid pro-
gramme at least one year in advance and, if pos-
sible, in multi-annual slices. Such a measure
would save time and help the industry to prepare
for the future more effectively.
28. Thirdly, EDIG recommends drawing up a
global strategy for the Euclid programme " based
on a medium-term and long-term technology
forecast combining a top-down approach by
determining future priority military operational
requirements and a bottom-up approach taking
into account the most promising new technolo-
gies, including those pulled by commercial use ".
29. Such a strategy, as the authors of the study
point out, would establish a common framework
proving the existence of a genuine European poli-
tical will and would also provide the industry with
the basis it needs to carry out the necessary group-
ing and restructuring operations and to tackle the
problems these will entail in terms of the mutual
dependence of the governments concerned.
30. Finally, the EDIG study recommends that
the industrial property right rules in the memoran-
dum of understanding should be amended so as to
relax the requirements imposed on participant
firms, in particular given that their financial contri-
bution rate is increasingly movingtp to 50Vo.
31. EDIG considers that if all these recommen-
dations were taken into consideration, it would
prove that Europeans are genuinely anxious to
maintain a defence industrial and technological
base.
32. The consultations your Rapporteur held
with various national associations in the defence
electronics industry on the subject of the Euclid
programme and the measures that should be taken
io make it more effective show that there is unani-
mous agreement as to the solutions that are need-
ed to overcome the existing problems.
33. In the first place, there is general agreement
that setting up a European Armaments Agency
would be beneficial for management of the Euclid
programme. The main advantage of such an int-
iiative would be access to a centralised coordina-
tion system and the creation of a central funding
agency making for simplified financial and
contract conditions.
34. However, some doubts persist: for instance,
would it not be the case that such an agency would
involve very heavy administrative and manage-
ment costs? Some national associations are also
uncertain that a centralised management agency
would make it easier to reach agreement on work
programmes, the constitution of consortia. the
preparation of proposals and the final choice of
projects.
35. The various national associations take the
view that the best way in which the Euclid
Research Cell can achieve its objective, i.e. better
cooperation between European defence electro-
nics industries, lies in efficient publicity cam-
paigns, transparency in the distribution of infor-
mation, and clear links between the CEPAs. A
register of European defence firms including the
names of contact persons would be a good way of
identifying the technologies, products and systems
sought by individual firms. A1l these measures
would help to form truly operational consortia.
36. Besides this, European firms consider that
use should be made of civilian projects for coope-
ration on defence research projects and that rela-
tions should be established on a case-by-case
basis. In their opinion, there are not enough initia-
tives in this area hence the need for the Research
Cell to keep up its contacts with DG XII and
DG XIII in the European Commission.
31. There is significant benefit to be had from
combining civil and military research pro-
grammes with common or similar technological
objectives. A single central funding agency for
Euclid would encourage such a move.
38. The question of what institutional changes
would help improve the working of the Euclid
programme from the viewpoint of the armaments
industry met with suggestions that were just as
clear and concise:
- 
the application of joint funding proce-
dures and contract conditions would
considerably improve the situation;
- 
the existence of a single source of fund-
ing would put an end to the delay caused
by the need to coordinate funding in the
vanous member countries ;
- 
there is a need for universal access to
documentation. At present Euclid docu-
ments are not subject to any rules whe-
reas they should have a logo, title. date
and number of issue.
39. The firms approve of the CEPA system
even though they consider that delays and red tape
give rise to serious problems during the initial
stages of a new CEPA.
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40. It is clear that if firms are to engage in
research activity with a partner. they must be able
to reckon with a return on their investment and on
gaining some advantage in terms of the cost and
time involved. A synergy of interests as regards
technologies and possible partners is an all-
important commercial factor for firms committing
themselves to a cooperation venture in a frame-
u,ork such as that of Euclid.
4l . Furthermore, the existing structure
involves projects in substantial additional cost,
the result being that only those firms with consi-
derable resources can envisage participating.
42. Some firms consider that Euclid does not
pay enough attention to information systems for
commanding and using information technologies ?.
43. The other problem that some firms empha-
sised stems from the fact that the procedure follo-
wed by Euclid seems to be geared to an increase
in the number of defence firms in Europe. But this
runs counter to a natural move across the conti-
nent to streamline the industry and create cross-
border alliances in an effort to increase the com-
petitiveness of the European defence industry on
the world market.
44. Finally, as far as financial contributions are
concerned, all the firms 
- 
whether individually or as
members of national associations 
- 
agree on a range
of comments. The financial contribution a firm
makes to a cooperation project must be recognised
as an investment and. as in any decision to invest,
the likely benefit to be had is an important factor. In
the case of the civil sector and prograrnmes funded
by the European Union. the proportion of industrial
investments reaching 507o js generally acceptable.
These firms can exploit the results they achieve on
an open market and their success mainly depends
on their effons and areas of expertise.
45. But in the defence sector. the benefits that
accrue to a firm depend in the majority of cases on
government decisions relating to purchases or
export restrictions. Such benefits fall off once an
industrial investment has been made. A combina-
tion of these various factors increases the commer-
cial risk and makes it extremely difficult for the
industry to take effective investment decisions.
IV The situation of the European defence
electronics industry
46. The problems affecting the European
defence electronics rndustry today are practically
identical to those confronting the rest of the
defence industry in Europe and have already been
studied in Assembly Document 1483 *. They can
be summarised as follows: the existence of a
European defence industry is indispensable if
Europe is to equip itself with autonomous struc-
tures enabling it to ensure its security and defence.
The European defence industry is in a state of
over-capacity mainly because each country is
inclined to maintain its own capabilities or even
create them in sectors in which they are virtually
non-existent. In addition, there is no European
domestic market to speak of even though this is a
necessary condition for the survival ofan industry
competing on the world market, in particular
against the United States.
47. This explains why the defence industry in
general and the defence electronics industry in par-
ticular needs to be restructured and streamlined on
the basis of the procedures that are beginning to be
applied in Europe. The example of the United
States, where this sea change is advancing by leaps
and bounds, should prompt European governments
and firms to follow suit because once the process is
complete in the United States, American firms will
have widened still further the huge gap that sepa-
rates them from their European counterparts.
48. As regards the long-term competitiveness of
the European defence electronics industry vis-d-vis
that of the United States, some of the most impor-
tant points are worth stressing: costs are influenced
primarily by national series production that is too
limited and by the application of the fair return rule
in cooperative activities; they are also affected by
the inadequate size of firms and over the years
ahead they will have to absorb the impact of the
modernisation or obsolescence of the range of tech-
nologies and products on the market. Lastly, the
absence of new programmes also has an influence.
49. Given that the current trend is not so much
towards the construction of new aircraft and mis-
sile systems, etc. but rather towards the moderni-
sation of their electronic components with a view
to making them more efficient, some fundamental
aspects of the changes that are under way need to
be taken into account: technological renovation
occurs every seven years in the defence electro-
nics industry; there is increasing technical homo-
geneity and mono-technology components are
giving way to multi-technology modules with
multiple applications.
50. In the field of research and development,
data supplied by the SPER u shows that in France,
the United Kingdom and the United States about
8. Report by Mrs Gurrado and Lord Dundee on " WEAG: the
course to be followed ".
9. Syndrcat des industries de matdriel professionnel 6lectro-
nlque et radio-6lectrique. Production and R&D work rn the
professional electronrcs industry: France, Germany, United
Kingdom. Unrted States. Analysis of the main sections of the
ADL report. 1990.
7 Appendix II contarns a list of research pro1ects fbr which
contracts have already been placed. The list marnly concerns
the electronrcs industrv and grves the names of the firms par-
trcrpating rn each project. lt was drawn up in September 1995
and w'as supphed by EDIG.
DOCUMENT 1524
two-thirds of military research and development
funding is allocated to industry, with the remain-
ing third going to public establishments. State
funding for research and development work in the
military electronics sector amounts to 40Vo in
France, 497o inthe United Kingdom, 67Vo inGer-
many and 90Vo tn the United States. Conversely,
the share of self-financing by industry stands at
377o in France, 23Vo rn Germany and 10% in the
United States.
51. It is clear that the defence electronics sector
relies to a greater extent than other sectors of the
defence industry on the ability to innovate, hence
the crucial importance of research and develop-
ment. Cooperation in Europe is essential from the
economic viewpoint but it is just as indispensable
from the industrial viewpoint as well.
52. The document entitled " How can the Euro-
pean Union armaments industry be competitive in
the face of international competition? " "'puts for-
ward ideas and conclusions that are extremely
interesting in the context of the present report.
53. In the section concerned with defence elec-
tronics equipment, the authors suggest, in support
of what your Rapporteur has already stressed, that
despite the reductions in European defence bud-
gets over the last five years and notwithstanding
the further cuts that are predictable, " the ten-
dency to seek as big a reduction as possible in the
number of human lives lost (zero deaths) means
that the maximum number of arms systems must
be automated ". This automation will be achieved
through accelerated " electronisation ", particu-
larly as regards " battlefield robots, auto-pilot
planes, guided and/or intelligent weapons, and
observation from space ".
54. With regard to the defence electronics mar-
ket, the study concedes that the United States enjoys
a predominant position owing to the following: the
size of its domestic market, very generous public
funding, links with furlher education establishments
and permanent public support for exports.
55. As for improving the defence electronics
industry's competitiveness, the first criterion that
deserves attention is its overall achievement, par-
ticularly in terms of technological progress, with
cost taking second place. This priority implies
that there must be sustained research and develop-
ment activity. The authors of the study also consi-
der that it is important to think in terms of " ups-
tream planning for modular and versatile
equipment so that it can be adapted to require-
ments that are frequently very varied ".
56. With regard to international competition,
especially from the United States, it is considered
fundamental " that essential components should
be accessible in all circumstances ". This raises
the question of technological independence, at
least on a European plane.
V Conclusions
57. Europe is faced with a situation in which
the trend is not so much one of increasing the
quantity but rather of improving the quality of
armaments. This can be achieved by modernising
electronic components so as to make them more
efficient. From this point of view, the prospects
for the European defence electronics industry are
fairly promising, provided it can make the most of
them.
58. The Euclid programme constitutes an
appropriate framework of activity on condition
that its possibilities are exploited to the maximum
and that the problems it has encountered so far are
solved. First, while it is true that when they laun-
ched the programme the governments' idea was to
make the best possible use of European resources
devoted to research and development activities,
facilitate cooperation in equipment procurement
programmes and strengthen industrial, scientific
and technological cooperation in European
defence sectors, they must now give effect to that
political will by providing proper support for
Euclid in order to solve the problems the pro-
gramme has encountered and make it as effective
as possible. There is no doubt that the creation of
the Research Cell is an important step forward in
this respect and that the transition to the Cell's
second phase will confirm and consolidate this
progress which, while it is of course necessary. is
probably still insufficient.
59. The delays currently affecting the pro-
gramme entail extra cost that is not negligible
given that the workforce remains idle pending
completion of the process. It should be possible to
solve this problem during the second phase of the
Research Cell.
60. The absence of a global strategy is another
problem that has to be overcome and which will
require the setting-up of a multi-year planning
system for funding. The governments' lack of
financial commitment clearly does nothing to
motivate firms to participate and can be interpre-
ted as an absence of genuine political will.
61. The reduced size ofone part ofthe industry
combined with insufficient resources, preventing
the industry from funding a major proportion of
research and development work on its own,
should prompt the governments to increase their
involvement, particularly in view of the defence
industry's situation as described above.
62. It should also be stressed that the problem
of the increase in the number of RTPs is perhaps10. Centre des hautes 6tudes de1994195, May 1995.
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not insoluble and that rather than looking for new
RTPs, it would be better to think in terms of reac-
tivating those currently dormant.
63. A greater measure of flexibility in the rules
on industrial property rights, as currently laid
down in the memorandum of understanding, is
also necessary. Furthermore, it would be desirable
to take up some of the proposals put forward by
various national associations in the defence elec-
tronics industry, particularly those advocating
more publicity about the Euclid programme,
transparency in the distribution of information,
and clear links between the CEPAs.
64. Setting up a register of European industrial
establishments working in the defence sector is an
idea that has already been proposed by our Com-
mittee " and its adoption would promote the crea-
tion of effective consortia after identifying appro-
priate technologies, products and systems
together with relevant firms working in those
areas.
65. In addition, it would be sensible to asso-
ciate military and civil programmes with common
technological objectives. This could be organised
by a central funding agency under the auspices of
Euclid, whose task would be to find civil projects
that could be of interest to the military sector.
66. Finally, as has been suggested in other
Committee reports, thought should be given to the
concept of fair return and it should be recognised
that, as applied at present, it does nothing to
resolve problems and indeed merely aggravates
them in many cases. Replacing this concept by
that of economic return is beginning to be a prio-
rity on which agreement will soon have to be rea-
ched.
67. In any event, it would be unfair not to attri-
bute credit to the work done under the Euclid pro-
gramme, which has, among other things, given
rise to a network of relations between European
firms. It would also be unfair not to mention the
excellent work done by the team working on the
programme. Firm political will and determination
of the part of government will help build on this
success in the field of research and development,
where the future of the European defence industry
in general and the defence electronics industry in
particular is at stake, not to mention that of Eur-
ope's security and defence.
l1. Document l4l9: " The European armaments agency 
-
leply to the 39th annual report of the Council ", submitted byMr Borderas.
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APPENDIX I














RTPs under contract .
RTP contracts in prepara,t"r. .
RTPs in implementation stage.
TOTAL approved RTPs 57 55 49
l1
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APPENDIX II
Lkt of frrms involved in RTPs,
mainly in the electronics sector
CEPA I Modern radar technology
RTP 1.1 Mission-related aspects
Lead nation: GE
Contract placement: 19.4.1994





UK: GEC FerrantiDuration: 18 months
Estimated end of work: November 1995
CEPA 2 Microelectronics





Winning consortium: BE: Alcatel Bell SDT
FR: Matra D6fense (Lead)
GE: BGT
UK: GEC MarconiDuration: 9 months
Estimated end of work: Completed
RTP 2.3 Military qualification
Lead nation: GE
Contract placement: 3.9.1993
Winning consortium: FR: Thomson-CSF
GE: TEMIC (DASA) + IMSIT: Italtel
UK: GPS Plessey +
Rood Technology +
Test and Assembly +
Walmsley MicroelectronicsDuration: 2 years
Estimated end of work: September 1995
RTP 2.8 Very high speed analog to digital converters
Lead nation: FR
Contract placement: 23.9.1994
Winning consortium: FR: Thomson-CSF TCS + SCTF
UK: Phoenix VLSIDuration: 24 months
Estimated end of work: September 1998
72
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Estimated end of work:
22.t2.1992
FR: CETIA






















FR: A6rospatiale + Dassault Aviation +
Dassault Electronique +
Eurocopter-FR + SAGEM +
Sextant + Thomson-CSF
GE: DASA (Lead) + Alcatel/SEl +
Dornier + ESG + Litef +
VDO
IT: Alenia + Elmer + Italtel
+ Marconi
NL: Fokker + NLR
SP: CASA + Ceselsa + Inisel
UK: British Aerospace +
GEC-Marconi Avionics +
GEC Plessey + Smiths Industries
24 months
September 1995
RTP 2.20 Future military requirements for advanced ND converters
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CEPA 6 Advanced information processing
RTP 6.1 Advanced workstation for command and control
Lead nation: UK
Contract placement: 24.9.93






UK: Logica Cambridge Ltd
(Lead)
Duration: 5 years
Estimated end of work: September 1998
RTP 6.2 High speed pattern recognition
Lead nation: FR
Contract placement: 31.12.92
Winning consortium: BE: BAIS
DE: TERMA






TU: Marmara Research Centre
UK: LogicaDuration: 3 years
Estimated end of work: March 1996
RTP 6.3 Knowledge engineering
Lead nation: NL
Contract placement: 5.2.93
Winning consortium: FR: CISI Ing6nierie
NL: Volmac Nederland BV
(Lead), Bolesian BV
UK: GEC Marconi Ltd.Duration: 3 years
Estimated end of work: January 1997
RTP 6.4 Combinatorial Algorithms for military applications
Lead nation: FR
Contract placement: 22.12.93
Winning consortium: FR: Onera-cert (Lead)
NL: Dept. of Economics and
Business Administration,
Dept. of Mathematics and




UK: Centre of Neural Networks,
London School of Information
SystemsDuration: 18 months
Estimated end of work: September 1995
t4
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RTP 6.5 Crew Assistant
Lead nation: NL
Contract placement: 12.7.94




Estimated end of work: MaY 1995
CEPA 8 Optoelectronic devices
RTP 8.1 Affordable Lightweight IR Sensors
Lead nation: UK
Contract placement: 1.6.93




NL: Signaal-UFSA (with FEL-TNO)
PO: EID
SP: ENOSA
UK: Pilkington Optronics (Lead)
Duration: 5 years
Estimated end of work: December 1998
RTP 8.2 Intelligent Sensors (New Technology and Design Concepts for IRST)
Lead nation: IT
Contract placement: 7.2.95
Winning consortium: FR: Sofradir, SAT, CEA-LETIIT: Galileo (Lead)
NL: TNO-FEL
PO: INETI
UK: Thorn-Emi Elctr., CRL
Duration: 5 Years
Estimated end of work: APril 2000
RTP 8.3 Solid State ktser Sources
Lead nation: FR
Contract placement: 4.9.92
Winning consortium: FR: Thomson-TTD (Lead) + BM
Industries
NO: Simrad Optronics +
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
UK: Pilkington Optronics
Duration: 4 Years
Estimated end of work: September 1996
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Estimated end of work:
RTP 9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology










Estimated end of work:
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